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DTSTAMP:20240626T180002Z
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240626T133000
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UID:dac_DAC 2024_sess155@linklings.com
SUMMARY:What's Your Best Side?
DESCRIPTION:Research Manuscript\n\nSide-channel leakage has been the scour
 ge of cryptographers for decades and yet its impacts to confidentiality of
  real-world systems and microarchitectural design are still being unearthe
 d. This session consists of presentations that capitalize on execution tim
 ing, power consumption, and even temperature leakages to infer secrets fro
 m machine learning architectures, trusted execution environments, and CPUs
  from top vendors! Several presentations also stress the importance of pro
 per software, hardware, and software-hardware co-design to students and pr
 actitioners.\n\nSecPaging: Secure Enclave Paging with Hardware-Enforced Pr
 otection against Controlled-Channel Attacks\n\nAs a prevalent privacy-pres
 erving technology, Trusted Execution Environment has become widely adopted
  in numerous commercial processors. Nonetheless, they remain susceptible t
 o various controlled-channel attacks. Untrusted operating systems can dedu
 ce enclave secrets by manipulating page tables or o...\n\n\nYunkai Bai and
  Peinan Li (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Scien
 ces); Yubiao Huang (Chinese Academy of Sciences); and Shiwen Wang, Xingbin
  Wang, Dan Meng, and Rui Hou (Institute of Information Engineering, Chines
 e Academy of Sciences)\n---------------------\nLevioso: Efficient Compiler
 -Informed Secure Speculation\n\nSpectre-type attacks have demonstrated a m
 ajor class of vulnerabilities\narising from speculative execution of instr
 uctions, the main performance enabler of modern CPUs. These attacks specul
 atively leak secrets that have been either speculatively loaded (seen in s
 andboxed programs) or non-speculative...\n\n\nAli Hajiabadi (National Univ
 ersity of Singapore); Archit Agarwal (University of California, San Diego)
 ; and Andreas Diavastos and Trevor E. Carlson (National University of Sing
 apore)\n---------------------\nThermalScope: A Practical Interrupt Side Ch
 annel Attack Based on Thermal Event Interrupts\n\nWhile interrupts play a 
 critical role in modern OSes, they have been exploited as a wide range of 
 side channel attacks to break system confidentiality, such as keystroke in
 terrupts, graphic interrupts and network interrupts. In this paper, we pro
 pose ThermalScope, a new side channel that exploits th...\n\n\nXin Zhang (
 Peking University); Zhi Zhang (University of Western Australia); Qingni Sh
 en (Peking University); Wenhao Wang (Institute of Information Engineering,
  Chinese Academy of Sciences); Yansong Gao (Data61, CSIRO); and Zhuoxi Yan
 g and Zhonghai Wu (Peking University)\n---------------------\nArchitectura
 l Whispers: Robust Machine Learning Models Fingerprinting via Frequency Th
 rottling Side-Channels\n\nSecurity practices in the field of Machine learn
 ing (ML)\nencompass a range of measures, with one notable strategy that in
 volves\nconcealing the architecture of ML models from users, thereby addin
 g\nan extra layer of protection. This proactive strategy serves multiple\n
 key purposes, including safeguardi...\n\n\nNajmeh Nazari, Chongzhou Fang, 
 and Hosein Mohammadi Makrani (University of California, Davis); Behnam Omi
 di (George Mason University); Mahdi Eslamimehr (University of California, 
 Los Angeles); Setareh Rafatirad and Avesta Sasan (University of California
 , Davis); Hossein Sayadi (California State University, Long Beach); Khaled
  N. Khasawneh (George Mason University); and Houman Homayoun (University o
 f California, Davis)\n---------------------\nConjuring: Leaking Control Fl
 ow via Speculative Fetch Attacks*\n\nIn this work, we propose a new attack
  called Conjuring that exploits one of the main features of CPUs' front-en
 d: speculative fetch of instructions. We show that the Pattern History Tab
 le (PHT) in modern CPUs are a great channel to learn and leak the control-
 flow of victim applications. Unlike prior...\n\n\nAli Hajiabadi and Trevor
  E. Carlson (National University of Singapore)\n---------------------\nWhi
 sper: Timing the Transient Execution to Leak Secrets and Break KASLR\n\nTh
 e vulnerabilities of transient execution have been exploited in\nmany side
 -channel attacks (SCA). We report Whisper, a novel\ntransient execution ti
 ming (TET) side channel, which is based on\nthe execution time difference 
 of transient execution under different\nconditions. We develop TET version
  of SC...\n\n\nYu Jin and Chunlu Wang (Beijing University of Posts and Tel
 ecommunications); Pengfei Qiu and Chang Liu (Tsinghua University); Yihao Y
 ang (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications); Hongpei Zheng an
 d Yongqiang Lyu (Tsinghua University); Xiaoyong Li (Beijing University of 
 Posts and Telecommunications); Gang Qu (Univ. of Maryland, College Park); 
 and Dongsheng Wang (Tsinghua University)\n\nTopic: Security\n\nKeyword: Ha
 rdware Security: Attack and Defense\n\nSession Chairs: Avani Dave (Intel C
 orporation) and Vincent Immler (Oregon State University)
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