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DTSTAMP:20240626T180033Z
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240625T133000
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UID:dac_DAC 2024_sess156_RESEARCH1733@linklings.com
SUMMARY:Uncovering Software-Based Power Side-Channel Attacks on Apple M1/M
 2 Systems
DESCRIPTION:Research Manuscript\n\nNikhil Chawla, Chen Liu, Abhishek Chakr
 aborty, Igor Chervatyuk, Thais Moreira Hamasaki, Ke Sun, and Henrique Kawa
 kami (Intel Corporation)\n\nTraditionally, power side-channel analysis req
 uires physical access to the target device, as well as specialized devices
  to measure the power consumption with enough precision.\nRecently researc
 h has shown that on x86 platforms, on-chip power meter capabilities expose
 d to a software interface might be used for power side-channel attacks wit
 hout physical access. In this paper, we show that such software-based powe
 r side-channel attack is also applicable on Apple silicon (e.g., M1/M2 pla
 tforms), exploiting the System Management Controller (SMC) and its power-r
 elated keys, which provides access to the on-chip power meters through a s
 oftware interface to user space software. \nWe observed data-dependent pow
 er consumption reporting from such SMC keys and analyzed the correlations 
 between the power consumption and the processed data. Our work also demons
 trated how an unprivileged user mode application successfully recovers byt
 es from an AES encryption key from a cryptographic service supported by a 
 kernel mode driver in MacOS. We have also studied the feasibility of perfo
 rming frequency throttling side-channel attack on Apple silicon. Furthermo
 re, we discuss the impact of software-based power side-channels in the ind
 ustry, possible countermeasures, and the overall implications of software 
 interfaces for modern on-chip power management systems.\n\nTopic: Security
 \n\nKeyword: Hardware Security: Attack and Defense\n\nSession Chairs: Sidd
 harth Garg (New York University) and Daniel Dinu (Intel Corporation)
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