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DTSTAMP:20240626T180034Z
LOCATION:Level 2 Lobby
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240626T180000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240626T190000
UID:dac_DAC 2024_sess256_LBR118@linklings.com
SUMMARY:Late Breaking Results: On the One-Key Premise of Logic Locking
DESCRIPTION:Late Breaking Results Poster\n\nYinghua Hu, Hari Cherupalli, M
 ike Borza, and Deepak Sherlekar (Synopsys)\n\nThe evaluation of logic lock
 ing methods has long been predicated on an implicit assumption that only t
 he correct key can unveil the true functionality of a protected circuit. C
 onsequently, a locking technique is deemed secure if it resists a good arr
 ay of attacks aimed at finding this correct key. In this paper, we challen
 ge this one-key premise by introducing a more efficient attack methodology
 , focused not on identifying that one correct key, but on finding multiple
 , potentially incorrect keys that can collectively produce correct functio
 nality from the protected circuit. The tasks of finding these keys can be 
 parallelized, which is well suited for multi-core computing environments. 
 Empirical results show our attack achieves a runtime reduction of up to 99
 .6% compared to the conventional attack that tries to find a single correc
 t key.
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