Presentation
SecPaging: Secure Enclave Paging with Hardware-Enforced Protection against Controlled-Channel Attacks
SessionWhat's Your Best Side?
DescriptionAs a prevalent privacy-preserving technology, Trusted Execution Environment has become widely adopted in numerous commercial processors. Nonetheless, they remain susceptible to various controlled-channel attacks. Untrusted operating systems can deduce enclave secrets by manipulating page tables or observing allocation- or swap-based page faults. In this paper, we propose SecPaging, a novel secure enclave paging mechanism based on hardware-enforced and microcode-supported protection to prevent these attacks. First, enclave PTEs are protected through hardware isolation, preventing privileged attackers from malicious tampering or observations. Second, Eager-Allocation mechanism is employed to prevent allocation-based controlled-channel attacks. Besides, Record-Reload mechanism is proposed to prevent swap-based controlled-channel attacks.
Event Type
Research Manuscript
TimeWednesday, June 262:30pm - 2:45pm PDT
Location3012, 3rd Floor
Security
Hardware Security: Attack and Defense