Presentation
The chipSECS Hardware Trojan Benchmark Suite and Verification Methodology
DescriptionWe generalize the problem of evaluating hardware Trojan detection methods as a decision problem, solvable by an interactive proof system, with a prover whose challenge is to find malicious signals in a design presented by a verifier. The verifier checks the validity of the proof presented by the prover, being a candidate set of malicious signals. The proof succeeds if and only if the prover finds all malicious signals in a design, and not more. Because a prover may not be trusted, benchmarks must be obfuscated in order to increase difficulty to manually analyze design files, and to mitigate brute-force guessing the correct set of signals. We propose an obfuscation technique by introducing random in a benchmark's signal names. Experimental analysis shows that obfuscation provides sufficient protection against manual source analysis, while brute-force guessing is mitigated by the interactive proof system by limiting the number of guesses for one specific, uniquely randomized, benchmark to 1.
Event Type
Work-in-Progress Poster
TimeTuesday, June 256:00pm - 7:00pm PDT
LocationLevel 2 Lobby
AI
Autonomous Systems
Cloud
Design
EDA
Embedded Systems
IP
Security