Presentation
Tripartite Server Mutual Attestation: TEE-based BFT for Boosting Server Reliability in Federated Learning
DescriptionTrusted Execution Environments (TEEs)-based Federated Learning (FL) faces significant challenges: (1) the server is unable to tolerate malicious physical attacks. (2) the capability of FL clients to install TEEs is significantly limited. Our study concentrates on developing a server-focused FL framework that reduces the need for extensive client-side TEE attestations while strengthening the server against side-channel attacks. We introduce three novel solutions: (1) employing server-only TEE, which significantly cuts down on the client-side attestation requirements; (2) implementing a TEE-supported mutual attestation and Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocol to boost server reliability; and (3) integrating Oblivious RAM to conceal memory access patterns (MAP), safeguarding against MAP attacks. These solutions aim to reinforce the privacy, integrity, and importantly reliability of FL systems, providing a balance between practicality and high security. The efficiency of our approach has been validated through extensive experiments. These confirm a well-balanced trade-off among increased latency, enhanced system security, and the reliability of the FL system.
Event Type
Work-in-Progress Poster
TimeTuesday, June 256:00pm - 7:00pm PDT
LocationLevel 2 Lobby
AI
Autonomous Systems
Cloud
Design
EDA
Embedded Systems
IP
Security